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Inspecting the Castle: The Constitutionality of
Municipal Housing Code Enforcement at Point of
Sale
KATHLEEN L. BARBER*
Privacy of the home is a fundamental American value' first devel-
oped in the writings of legal philosphers2 and later embodied in the
United States Constitution.3 From its inception, however, the abso-
* Professor and Chairperson of the Department of Political Science, John Carroll Univer-
sity.
Professor Barber has been a member of the Shaker Heights, Ohio, City Council since 1973,
and serves as Chairperson of the Building and Housing Inspection Committee. This article
is based in part on her experience in this position.
1. Colonial resistance to British searches for smuggled goods in the homes of the local
citizenry provided an electrifying issue around which the struggle for independence was
organized. See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURES AND THE SUPREME COURT, 30-42 (1966). See
also Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
The "writs of assistance," issued by royal authority to sheriffs and constables to keep the
peace while revenue officers searched suspected places for smuggled goods, were characterized
by one colonial lawyer as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power..." which placed "the
liberty of every man in the hands of a petty officer." 2 JOHN ADAMS, LEGAL PAPERS 140-42
(Wroth & Zobel ed. 1965). See Petition of Lechmere, Quincy 412 app.1 (Province Mass.,
Superior Court of Judicature 1761). (Commonly known as the Writs of Assistance Case.) John
Adams later noted that with the institution of this case "... the child Independence was
born." 2 JOHN ADAMS, supra at 107.
2. The classical conflict between private right4 and the public good lies at the root of
contemporary debate about housing code enforcement. Natural law, according to John Locke,
endowed human beings with "inalienable" rights, the most fundamental of which was the
right to property. "Inalienable" meant that the government could not take it away, except
in the most limited of circumstances where the taking might be necessary to protect the
inalienable right of another. J. LOCKE, Two TIM'sas oF GOVERNMENT 303-20 (P. Laslett ed.
1960); Hamilton, Property - According to Locke, 41 YALE L.J. 864 (1932).
Blackstone took a more stringent view with respect to governmental infringement upon an
individual's inalienable rights than that espoused by Locke. Speaking of the inalienable
rights of property, he stated: "so great is the regard of the law for private property, that it
will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole
community." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 13P.
3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right is also protected in various state constitutions. See, e.g., art. 1, § 14 of the Ohio
State Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and posses-
sions, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person and things to be
seized.
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lute rule has been restricted by public health and safety considera-
tions.' The tension between these two competing policies continues
today in the controversy surrounding inspections of private dwell-
ings pursuant to the enforcement of municipal housing codes.5
In the last ten years, a number of cities have attempted to deal
with housing code enforcement problems by adopting a policy of
OHIo CONST., art. I, §14. See also MONT. CONST. art. II, §10; AiAsKA CONST. art. I, §22. Hawaii
and Illinois additionally protect "communications," to ensure that the warrant requirement
is applied to wiretapping. HAWAII CONST. art. I, §5; ILL. CONST. art. I, §6.
4. Even before these concepts were constitutionalized in the United States, the safety of
society provided the justification for the forerunners of housing codes. Urban land use regula-
tions specified construction with fireproof building materials in Boston and Philadelphia.
MAss. LAWS 269 (1672); 2 PA. STAT. 311, ch.59. In New York City, a colonial ordinance
required any structure in specified areas to be constructed of "stone or brick, and roofed with
tile or slate." cited in L. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLuM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF
FRUSTRATION 26-28 (1968); Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An
Integration, 56 B.U.L. Rev. 1, 41 (1976) (hereinafter referred to as Abbott) In Baltimore
health laws first authorized warrantless entries in 1801 to enforce protection of the public from
disease under the increasingly crowded conditions of urban living. BALTIMORE, MD., ORDI-
NANCE No. 23, 6 (1801-02) cited in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 369-70 (1959). The New
York Tenement House Law of 1867 represented an attempt to deal with the spread of disease
which resulted from the overcrowded, unsanitary conditions of life of the immigrant popula-
tion. Cholera epidemics were the immediate evil to be controlled, and not insignificantly,
these epidemics endangered the lives of lawmakers and mansion-dwellers as-well as the poor.
Abbott, supra, at 41.
The use of housing codes as tools of state and local policy gradually became established in
urban areas. Twelve states and forty cities had housing laws in effect by 1920. Id.
Nuisance laws also became an accepted form of permissible intrusion upon the citizen's
inalienable right of property. The historical rule is best restated in the case of Booth v. Rome,
W & 0 Ry., 140 N.Y. 267,274, 35 N.E. 592,594 (1893): "[N]o one has absolute freedom in
the use of his property, but is restrained by the coexistence of equal rights in his neighbor to
the use of his property." The applicaton of nuisance law to abandoned or deteriorated housing
is explored in Note, New Judicial Approaches to Maintaining Housing Quality in the Cities,
4 FORDHAM URaAN L.J. 403-418 (1976).
Another early intrusion still recognized today is the concept of eminent domain. Eminent
domain, according to natural law theorists, is an inherent power of sovereignty to take private
land if it is needed for public purposes. Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of Eminent
Domain, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 596-597 (1942). However, the overexercise of this sovereign right
ultimately led to the English barons' efforts to destroy royal prerogative over the land. The
limit of due process was guaranteed in the Magna Carta: "No freeman shall be arrested, or
detained in prison, or deprived of his freehold, or in any way molested; and we will not set
forth against him, nor send against him, unless by the lawful judgment of his peers and by
the law of the land." MAGNA CARTA, ch. 39 (1215)(emphasis added); See BossELMAN, CALLI
& BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 53-104 (1973).
The fifth amendment provides almost the exact protection to American citizens today as
the Magna Carta gave to English citizens. The fifth amendment reads in relevant part,
"[Nior shall any person.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.., nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. V.
5. See, e.g., CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA., CODE, ch. 15, §15.1-7.2 (1974); CINCINNATI, Omo,
ORDINANCE 556-1973, §CC-3-47.03 (1973); PASADENA, CAL., ORDINANCES 5121 (1973), as
amended PASADENA, CAL. ORDINANCES 5231, 5254, 5280; SHAKER HEIGHTS, OHIO, ORDINANCES
76-93, ch. 1415 (1976), as amended ORDINANCES 77-67, 77-107 (1977).
Housing Code Enforcement
inspecting houses at the point of sale. By tying the inspection to a
commercial transaction, municipal authorities believe they are
diminishing the invasion of privacy involved in inspection of private
homes, while maintaining or upgrading the quality of the commu-
nity's housing stock by the requirement of subsequent code com-
pliance.
This article examines the inherent conflict existing between the
present need for housing code enforcement and traditional notions
concerning personal privacy and freedom from unreasonable gov-
ernmental searches of private residences. In addition, it discusses
local ordinances enacted by various cities which implement the pol-
icy of inspection at point of sale, analyzing the constitutionality of
the "administrative searches" used to enforce this policy in light of
the existing standards for such searches promulgated by the Su-
preme Court in recent years. Finally, it will weigh the need for
proper housing code enforcement, and the use of inspections at
point of sale to attain this goal, against the claim that such inspec-
tions may infringe on privacy interests.
MODERN HOUSING PROBLEMS AND THE NEED FOR CODE ENFORCEMENT
During the depression and through the Second World War little
housing was built in the United States. As a result, a great backlog
of demand accumulated. After the Second World War, the
"throwaway ethic" prevailed in housing policy as the federal gov-
ernment subsidized, through its mortgage practices and through
highway construction, the migration of large segments of the urban
population to the suburbs.' The urban housing abandoned by the
middle class was rapidly filled by migrants from the south and from
neighboring rural areas. In 1949, to ease urban housing problems
caused by this transition, Congress began providing federal grants
and loans for slum clearance and urban redevelopment.7 Adminis-
trators of these new federal programs were directed to stress
"adoption, improvement and modernization of local [housing]
codes and regulations relating to land use and adequate standards
of health, sanitation, and safety for dwelling accommodations.",
When the federal government modified its approach from
6. U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 66, 94-
103 (1969) (hereinafter referred to as NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS); D. CAPUITO,
URBAN AMERICA 121 (1976)(hereinafter referred to as CAPUTO); Kain, The Distribution and
Movement of Jobs and Industry, THE METROPOLITAN ENIGMA 1-43 (J. Wilson, ed. 1970).
7. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, §§101-10, 63 Stat. 413 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§1450-90(1970)). See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, supra note 6, at 152-169.
8. Housing Act of 1949, §101(a), 63 Stat. 414 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §1451(a)
(1970)).
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"renewal" to "redevelopment" in the Housing Act of 1954,1 cities
were given incentives to develop housing codes that would be part
of a "workable program for community improvement."'" In 1964,
housing codes became a statutory condition for receiving federal
subsidies for housing assistance." The adoption of housing codes
proceeded apace under this stimulus; by 1968 most cities over 50,000
population and half of the cities under 50,000 population had
adopted housing codes.' 2
Adopting a code is quite different from enforcing a code, however,
and non-enforcement became the national norm. 3 As early as 1956,
an official of the Housing and Home Finance Agency identified local
governments' failure to use their police power effectively as the
"ultimate" cause of urban blight." Cleveland, for example, which
had one of the earliest and "best" housing laws in the nation, suc-
cumbed quickly to inactivity, and permitted the housing in large
areas of the central city to deteriorate beyond repair.15
While the conditions traced above are largely urban phenomena,
urbanization of the close-in suburbs has enlarged the area of con-
cern. The inner ring of older suburbs in the major metropolitan
areas has experienced to a lesser degree the deterioration of housing
stock and related problems, particularly in zones of racial transi-
tion.'"
9. Housing Act of 1954, ch. 649, §303, 68 Stat. 623 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§1451(c)(1970)). This modification resulted from the perception that urban renewal was
destroying the housing of low income groups without replacement. Whether this destruction
was carried out by design or by the rule of unintended consequences has not yet been settled.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, supra note 6, at 67.
10. Housing Act of 1954, ch. 649, §303, 68 Stat. 623, 624 (current version 4t 42 U.S.C.
§1451(c)(1970)). The "workable program" requirement signaled the large-scale entry of phys-
ical planning into the urban redevelopment process. CAPUTO, supra note 6, at 125. In many
cities, planning was "a tool used by those with power against those without it." Id. at 127.
For example, the destruction of a viable low income community in the West End of Boston
is documented in H. GANS, THE URBAN VILLAGERS 305-335 (1962). See also Rubinowitz, A
Question of Choice: Access of the Poor and the Black to Suburban Housing, THE URBANIZA-
TION OF THE SUBURBs 354-355. (L. Masotti & J. Hadden eds. 1973) (hereinafter referred to as
Rubinowitz).
11. Housing Act of 1964, §301(a), P.L. 88-560, 78 Stat. 785 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§1451(c)(1970)).
12. Abbott, supra note 4, at 44.
13. Poor enforcement of housing codes is documented by the National Advisory Commis-
sion on Civil Disorders in thirteen American cities, all of which have experienced urban
violence in recent years. U.S. NATIONAL ADviSORY COMMISSION ON CIViL DISORDERS, REPORT 146
(1968).
14. See Guandolo, Housing Codes in Urban Renewal, 25 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1956).
15. M. LAcKRmZ, THE HOUGH RMOTS OF 1966 28-37 (1968); L. SCHALLER, RACE AND POvuTY
34-36 (1964); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, supra note 6 at 294.
16. C. Bradford and L. Rubinowitz, The Urban-Suburban Investment-Disinvestment
Process: Consequences for Older Neighborhoods, THE SUBURBAN SEVENTIEs 77-86 (L. Masotti
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Economists and sociologists propose alternative explanations for
this phenomenon. Certain economists argue that as housing ages, a
natural process of "filtering down" through income groups occurs,
exhibiting a market mechanism which provides housing for low in-
come families. 7 Some sociologists, on the other hand, suggest a
group struggle for control of neighborhoods, with "succession" by
those less able to maintain the property. 8
These models ignore both public and private investment decisions
which shape if not control the development of human communities.
Deterioration is not an inevitable trend over which policymakers
lack control. The federal government has not only subsidized the
middle class exodus from the cities since the 1950's through its
mortgage policies and highway building, but also continues to en-
courage abandonment of older housing by tax rebates for pur-
chasers of new homes." While these policies may have been
adopted to aid the construction industry, their inevitable if un-
intended effect is to harm the older suburbs and the remaining
urban housing stock.
Government encouragement of population mobility to fringe sub-
urbs has been accompanied by private disinvestment, as mortgage
bankers and realtors have redlined older neighborhoods. Savings
and loan associations have often terminated lending in the private
home market in older neighborhoods, while insurance companies
tend to follow similar patterns of disinvestment in multi-family
buildings. 0 Aging neighborhoods are considered unstable or unre-
warding investments, a judgment which becomes a self-fulfilling
prophecy when disinvestment occurs.2'
Racial Change and Code Enforcement
As noted earlier, areas undergoing racial integration, or in some
instances resegregation, have been especially vulnerable to this
combination of public policy and private decision-making.2 Be-
ed. 1975). (hereinafter referred to as Bradford & Rubinowitz) See also Weitzman,
Neighborhood Preservation in New York City, 3 FoRDHAm URaAN L.J. 425 (1975).
17. A. DowNs, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS 2-6, 202 (1973).
18. Bradford and Rubinowitz, supra note 16, at 78-79.
19. Sternlieb & Lake, Aging Suburbs and Black Homeownership, THI SUBURBAN
SEvEN TEs 105, 116 (L. Masotti ed. 1975)(hereinafter referred to as Sternlieb and Lake).
20. Bradford and Rubinowitz, supra note 16, at 83-84; D. NEZER, ECONONUCS AND URBAN
PROBLEMS 23-48 (2d ed. 1974).
21. The role of the appraiser in this process is critical, because of the import of the
appraisal to a lending decision. "Appraisers are trained to assume that older neighborhoods
inevitably decline, even if they are presently viable middle income areas." Bradford and
Rubinowitz, supra note 16, at 83; see AMERuCAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, THE
APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, 81-100 (5th ed. 1967).
22. See note 16 supra.
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tween 1960 and 1970, the rate of suburbanization of black urban
families was slightly higher than that of white urban families, but
the number of blacks involved remained extremely small.2 For
blacks, the housing market remains artificially restricted by dis-
criminatory practices in spite of federal and state laws prohibiting
such discrimination.2' The distortions caused by racial discrimina-
tion in the housing market result in the clustering of the outwardly
mobile black population in a few suburbs. These suburbs then expe-
rience a repetition of the urban pattern of public and private disin-
vestment.21 Residential segregation moves outward not only because
of disparity in income between blacks and whites but also because
of exclusionary zoning, government and private lending policies,
discrimination by individual homeowners and landlords, and real
estate industry practices .2
While some analysts view rigorous enforcement of housing codes
as a weapon of exclusion of potential black residents in transitional
areas,2 other observers perceive non-enforcement of standards in
integrating communities as another manifestation of racism by de-
liberate neglect." The variety of patterns of racial transition in older
suburbs may explain these conflicting interpretations. Blockbusting
practices in the real estate industry accelerate white flight as home-
owners seek to maximize their gain before the realtors' predicted
decline in property values sets in. If housing codes were not pre-
viously enforced, but are now enforced by the municipality against
the new black homeowner, the effect is clearly punitive and repairs
may be prohibitively costly for a family which has extended its
financial capability for the purchase. However, if housing codes are
23. Moves from city to suburb were made by 29.2% of blacks and 27.5% of whites between
1960 and 1970; by 1970, 4.8% of the suburban population was black. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, SrTrIsIcAL ABsTRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES 17 (1974).
24. M. DANIELSON, THE PoLrrIcs OF EXCLUSION 12-14 (1976)(hereinafter referred to as
DANIELSON); Sternlieb and Lake, supra note 19, at 107-108; T. STANBACK, JR. & R. KNIGHT,
SUBURBANIZATION AND THE CITY 47-48 (1976).
25. Rubinowitz, supra note 10; M. STRASZHEIM, AN ECONOMETmC ANALYSIS OF THE URBAN
HousINo MARKEr 126-41 (1975); J. KLAIN & J. QUIGLEY, HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION 283-300 (1975).
26. Taeuber, Racial Segregation: The Persisting Dilemma, THE SUBURBAN SEVENTIES 87
(L. Masotti ed. 1975). Taeuber identifies six relevant practices of the real estate industry:
"a) limiting the access of black brokers to realty associations and multiple listing services;
b) refusals by white realtors to cobroke on transactions that would foster racial integration;
c) blockbusting, panic selling and racial steering; d) racially identifying vacancies, either
overtly or by nominally benign codes (advertising housing according to racially identifiable
schools or other neighborhood identifiers); e) refusing to show houses or apartments or refus-
ing to encourage blacks to consider housing in white neighborhoods; [and] f) reprimanding
or penalizing brokers and salesmen who act to facilitate racial integration." Id. at 92.
27. DANIELSON, supra note 24, at 6, 14.
28. U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 146 (1968).
[Vol. 10
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not enforced in transition areas, whether or not previously enforced,
the new locus of black homeownership may deteriorate rapidly, and
the homeowner will be caught again in the spiral of the social dec-
line which he or she sought to escape by leaving the central city.
Traditional Code Enforcement
Hence municipal officials seeking to maintain property values in
particular and the quality of life in general in viable urban neighbor-
hoods and older suburbs have tried to develop new approaches to
housing code enforcement. The traditional mode of seeking home-
owner compliance in those cities where housing codes have been
enforced is area-wide inspection. City officials conduct a house to
house inspection in a sector of the city chosen on the basis of some
reasonable priority, such as age of houses or condition of repair.
Citations are issued where code violations are found, and compli-
ance is sought through periodic re-inspections, with criminal penal-
ties as a last-resort enforcement action. Typically, such inspections
include structural features, plumbing and electrical connections,
and are limited to ground floor, basement and exterior portions of
the residence for minimal invasion of privacy.
Due to changing family and work patterns of the population, such
inspections have been increasingly difficult to make. The decline in
the birthrate and the rise in the number of both single-parent fami-
lies and families in which both spouses work mean that fewer homes
are occupied during the day when inspections can be made. Inspec-
tions and re-inspections for compliance become more difficult, if not
impossible to achieve. The cost of inspection programs rises while
the number of dwellings brought into compliance declines. The
growing value placed on privacy, and increasing resentment of bu-
reaucratic intrusions reinforce the social patterns which have made
regular inspection programs less practical.
INSPECTION AT POINT OF SALE
Inspection at point of sale provides an alternative method of hous-
ing code enforcement which responds to several of these concerns.
Since the homeowner makes an appointment for the required
inspection, the intrusion occurs at least partially at his or her con-
venience. Since the property is prepared for showing to prospective
purchasers anyway, the inspection is viewed as a lesser invasion of
privacy than would otherwise be the case. Finally, the entire house
can feasibly be inspected.
Forerunners of contemporary point of sale inspection ordinances
provided voluntary inspection services for a fee upon request at the
19781
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time a residential property is being sold.2 Certificates of Compli-
ance and Certificates of Occupancy have been used in some cities
for almost two decades as means of maintaining property values and
preventing deterioration in residential buildingsY' The certificate
might indicate compliance with city zoning and housing codes, or
list actual records of inspection and violation. Where such certifi-
cates have been made available, their use has been encouraged by
lenders, who value the information as a protection against risk that
subsequent code enforcement may diminish the profitability of an
investment.' Such programs provide incentives for maintenance or
improvement of the housing stock, but depend for their effective-
ness on voluntary compliance and norms of community support.
Their effectiveness is also limited by inadequate inspection person-
nel and difficulties in securing access for inspections.32 Supportive
state and federal laws may encourage housing inspection and code
compliance, but do not mandate local action.3'
In the early 1970's, communities began to require that an inspec-
tion of property be made at the point of sale, and that an inspection
certificate or certificate of compliance be provided by the seller to
the buyer. Disclosure of code violations would presumably influence
the sale price, and the money would be available to make correc-
tions, which are mandatory within a specified period of time. Such
ordinances were passed in 1973 by Pasadena, California 3' and Cin-
cinnati, Ohio, 31 in 1974 by Charlottesville, Virginia, 3 and in 1976 by
Shaker Heights, Ohio.37
29. R. Counts, Jr., Certificates of Compliance, AmERIcAN SocIErY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS,
REPORT No. 220 at 4 (1967) (hereinafter referred to as R. Counts, Jr.).
30. A Certificate of Compliance is an official record, supplied for a fee to building owners,
documenting the building's use and indicating conformance with applicable codes of the city.
A Certificate of Occupancy is a similar record but may permit occupancy of a building
pending specified code corrections. R. Counts, Jr., supra note 29, at 4.
31. Id. at 3. A situation in which such a certificate would have been useful occurred in
Illinois when the buyer of a multi-family building was required to deconvert from seven to
three apartments to conform to the zoning code. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected his
claim of a non-conforming use, even though he was not aware of the illegal conversion by the
seller. Eggert v. Board of Appeals of City of Chicago, 29 Ill. 2d 591, 195 N.E.2d 164 (1963).
32. Id. at 3.
33. See, e.g., Pennsylvania's mandatory "truth in housing sales" law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21,§611-615 (Purdon Supp. 1978) (amending PA. LAws 288, §1 (1955)); and the United
States' Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, providing for federal grants to munici-
palities for planning and administering concentrated code enforcement programs. Housing
and Urban Development Act, 12 U.S.C. §§1701s, 1749aa (1965).
34. PASADENA, CAL. ORDINANCE 5121 (July 31, 1973), as amended PASADENA, CAL.,
OaDlANCES 5231, 5254, 5280.
35. CnNciNN^i, OHIo, ORDINANCE 556-1973, §CC-3-47.03 (1973).
36. CHARLrrEsviILz, VA., CODE ch. 15, §15.1-7.2 (1974).
37. SHAKER HmHTS, OHIo ORDINANCE No. 76-93, ch. 1415 (1976), amended by ORDINANCES
77-67 and 77-107 (1977).
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The Pasadena Ordinance
Pasadena's "Occupancy Ordinance" requires an inspection of all
dwelling units in single-family, two-family or multi-family residen-
tial buildings, whenever new occupants move into a unit, or a unit
is sold.38 In addition, it prohibits any residence from being reoccu-
pied until a Certificate of Occupancy is issued.' This certificate is
issued if the unit complies with all housing and zoning codes and
ordinances. 0 If a building is not in compliance, deficiencies must be
corrected within six months. 1 A Temporary Certificate of Occu-
pancy is available, prior to the completion of any necessary correc-
tive maintenance, "upon a showing of a good cause.' 2 Under the
ordinance, a person wishing to contest an adverse determination of
a city inspection may appeal to the Housing Advisory and Appeals
Board, and from there to the City Board of Directors.'3 Water and
Power departments aid in the administration of the compliance
program by providing their residential records to the inspection
agency." Similarly, effective enforcement is made possible, in part,
by the fact that these departments will withhold services until they
receive approval from the City's Occupancy Inspection Section.' 5
The Pasadena Ordinance was challenged on constitutional
grounds in Currier v. City of Pasadena.4" The trial court found that
the warrantless search of residences mandated by the city's inspec-
tion ordinance violated both the fourth amendment of the United
States Constitution 7 and article one, section thirteen of the Califor-
nia Constitution. On appeal, the California Appellate Court re-
versed the trial court's decision and upheld the ordinance."
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that on the surface
38 PASADENA, CAL., ORDINANCE No. 5121, §3.
39. Id. at §3.
40. Id. at § 7.
41. Id. at §6.
42. Id. at §8.
43. PASADENA HOUSING CODE, ORDINANCE 3729.
44. PASADENA HOUSING AND ComuNrrY DEvELoPMENT DrARTmENr, OccuPANcy INSPECTION
PROGRAM 3-4 (1975).
45. Id.
46. 48 Cal. App. 3d 810, 121 Cal. Rptr. 913, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975).
47. See note 3 supra.
48. Article I, section thirteen, states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a warrant may
not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized.
CAL. CONST. art. 1, §13. (added Nov. 5, 1974).
49. Currier v. City of Pasadena, 48 Cal. App. 3d 810, 121 Cal. Rptr. 913, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1000 (1975).
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the ordinance was unconstitutional." The public need was not of
sufficient gravity to sustain the use of warrantless searches, nor was
the use of search warrants impossible.5 1 Additionally, the court
found the city's argument that these searches were "consensual"
specious: "To compel a property owner to let his property lie vacant
and to prohibit him from selling it, unless he 'consents' to a war-
rantless search is to require an involuntary consent. 5 2 The ordi-
nance was saved, however, by the city's concession that the ordi-
nance was subject to the provisions of the California Code of Civil
Procedure." Those provisions set forth a statutory scheme for ac-
complishing the purposes of the Pasadena ordinance, requiring the
issuance of a warrant by a judge upon submission of an affidavit
showing cause for the inspection.5 "Cause", as defined by the legis-
lature, existed "if reasonable standards for conducting a routine or
area inspection are satisfied... or there is reason to believe that a
condition of non-conformity exists."" Since Pasadena's ordinance
provided for routine inspections on change of ownership or occu-
pancy, warrants could validly issue. The court noted that:
[The Pasadena Ordinance] provides an on-going check on the
observance of the City's zoning, health and housing ordinances, in
a manner involving a minimal invasion of privacy. It also permits
any corrective action found necessary by the inspection to be per-
formed with minor [and usually no] interference with an occu-
pant."
The city's interest in the inspections outweighed the minimal inva-
sion of privacy caused by an inspection under the warrant stan-
dards.
The Cincinnati Ordinances
In Cincinnati, two ordinances were adopted to "preserve quality
in [the city's] housing stock . . . protect its citizens from housing
which is a threat to their health and safety; and .. provide more
"157effective information to prospective housing purchasers ... .
The first of the two ordinances required an owner of residentialproperty to have the residence inspected by the city prior to enter-
50. Id. at 814, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 916.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 814, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
54. Id. at 817, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 917.
55. Id. at 817, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 917-18; CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 1822.52 (West 1972).
56. Currier v. City of Pasadena, 48 Cal. App. 3d 810, 817, 121 Cal. Rptr. 913, 918 (1975).
57. Preamble to CINCINNATI, OHIO ORDINANCE 556-1973.
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ing into a contract for sale." Subsequent to this inspection, the
owner must obtain a certificate of housing inspection and present,
it to the prospective purchaser of the property." The seller must
then obtain a signed acknowledgment from the buyer indicating his
receipt of a copy of the inspection. If the seller fails to follow this
procedure, then, by operation of law, he warrants to the buyer that
the structure is in "substantial compliance" with the city's housing
and zoning codes."0 The second ordinance provides penalties for
violation of the first, making it a misdemeanor for an owner or agent
to fail to tender the certificate to the prospective buyer.6'
The Cincinnati ordinances were upheld, in part, by the Ohio Su-
preme Court in Wilson v. Cincinnati."2 The ordinance had been
challenged by two Cincinnati residents, initially joined by the Cin-
cinnati Board of Realtors." The trial court invalidated the ordi-
nances, and enjoined the city from enforcing them." The Ohio Ap-
pellate Court found that although the inspection program was a
valid exercise of the city's police power, 5 the warrantless inspections
which the ordinance authorized violated the fourth amendment.66
Both parties appealed this decision to the Ohio Supreme Court.
The Ohio Supreme Court found that the inspection program was
a valid exercise of the city's police power:
[The ordinance] encourages inspection of residential housing
prior to sale and, thus, supplements enforcement of the city's hous-
ing code. The ordinance bears witness to the city's attempt to
preserve the quality of its existing housing stock and, in that re-
spect, possesses a real and substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public, and is nei-
ther arbitrary nor unreasonable. 7
The court rejected plaintiffs argument that the provision which
gave the buyer an implied warranty if the seller failed to comply
58. CINCINNATI, OHIO ORDINANCE 556-1973, §CC-3-47.03 (A).
59. Id.
60. CINCINNATI, OHIo ORDINANCE 556-1973, §CC-3-47.03 (D).
61. CiNCINNATI, OHno ORDNnANcE 557-1973, §CC-3-64.
62. 46 Ohio St. 2d 138, 346 N.E.2d 666, (1976).
63. Id. at 140, 346 N.E.2d at 668. The Cincinnati Board of Realtors and Chester J.
Wilson were later dismissed as plaintiffs for lack of standing.
64. Id. at 140, 346 N.E.2d at 668.
65. Id. at 142, 346 N.E.2d at 669. Under Ohio law, a police regulation is not invalid "unless
it clearly appears that such regulation bears no real and substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals or general, welfare of the public, or is unreasonable or arbitrary." West
Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 119, 205 N.E.2d 382, 387. The court applied the
West Jefferson test in finding that the Cincinnati inspection program was a valid exercise of
police power.
66. Wilson v. Cincinnati, 46 Ohio St. 2d 138, 144, 346 N.E.2d 668, 671 (1976).
67. Id. at 142, 346 N.E.2d at 669.
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with the ordinance was too vague and indefinite to withstand a
fourteenth amendment due process test. "
However, the Ohio court balked at approving that aspect of the
inspection program which provided for enforcement through the use
of criminal penalties.6 The city argued that because the seller ar-
ranges for the inspection, including the proper time, he consents to
the search, thereby waiving his fourth amendment rights. 0 The
court reasoned, however, that "the coercion represented by the sole
alternative of possible criminal prosecution clearly negates any
'consent' which may be inferred."'" The ordinance could not be
constitutionally enforced while the criminal penalties remained."
In a concurring opinion in Wilson, Justice Celebrezze suggested
specific means by which the city could save its criminal penalties
under the rule of Camara." By inserting a clause requiring inspec-
tors to advise homeowners of their right to refuse entry without a
warrant, and to obtain a warrant if permission is refused, the re-
jected penalties would be rescued." However, the City of Cincinnati
apparently preferred to delete the invalid penalty sections, depend-
ing on the warranty provision for compliance. 5
The Shaker Heights Ordinance
In 1976, the City of Shaker Heights, Ohio authorized housing
inspections at point of sale as a means of "preserv[ing] quality in
its residential structures, . . . protect[ing] its citizens from housing
which may be a threat to the public health, safety, or welfare, and
. . . provid[ing] more effective information to the purchasers of
residential properties." 6 Under the Shaker Heights program, a
68. Id. at 142-43, 346 N.E.2d at 669-70. Cf. Columbus v. Rogers, 41 Ohio St. 2d 161, 324
N.E.2d 563 (1975); Columbus v. Thompson, 25 Ohio St. 2d 26, 266 N.E.2d 571 (1971).
69. Wilson v. Cincinnati, 46 Ohio St. 2d 138, 144, 346 N.E.2d 668, 671 (1976).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 147-49, 346 N.E.2d at 672-73, citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967). It has been held that under the fourth amendment a person may waive his fourth
amendment rights by consenting to a search. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967).
However, for the consent to be valid it must be "voluntary and uncoerced, either physically
or psychologically." United States v. Fike, 449 F.2d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1972); see also Phelper
v. Decker, 401 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1968); Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965).
74. Wilson v. Cincinnati, 46 Ohio St. 2d 138, 147-49, 346 N.E.2d 666, 672-73 (1976). The
court relied heavily in its decision on the Supreme Court's ruling in Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 102 to
111, infra.
75. Letter from Ely M.T. Ryder, Asst. City Solicitor, City of Cincinnati, Ohio to Russell
R. Miller, July 26, 1976. See Note, Wilson v. City of Cincinnati: Administrative Search and
Seizure in Ohio, 4 Omo NowrTHmE U. L. Rxv. 477, 483-84 n.34 (1977).
76. SHAKER HmoIs, OHIo., ORDINANCE 76-93 (1976), preamble.
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seller of single-family, two-family or duplex residences is required
to obtain a signed acknowledgment which indicates that the buyer
has received a Certificate of Housing Inspection or Compliance.7
For the acknowledgment to be valid, the certificate which the buyer
receives must have been obtained by the seller within one year prior
to the execution of the contract of sale. The acknowledgment must
be deposited in escrow before title transfers or funds are distrib-
uted.78 Either the buyer or the seller must correct code violations
within ninety days. In case of imminent danger to public health
or safety, immediate corrections may be required.8 However, upon
a showing of good cause, extensions may be allowed.8
In the Shaker Heights ordinance, as in Cincinnati, if the seller
fails to follow the inspection procedure, an implied warranty is given
to the buyer, by operation of law, that the structure is in compliance
with the Building, Housing and Zoning Codes, and all other applic-
able ordinances.8" This implied warranty can serve as the basis for
a civil cause of action by the buyer against the seller for the costs
the buyer incurs in complying with the housing code. In addition,
penalties are provided for non-compliance with correction orders by
the owner, and for violation of requirements by the escrow agent.1
No penalty, however, is imposed for refusal to permit an inspec-
tion. Furthermore, the ordinance is enforced in conjunction with
the regular search warrant requirement of the city's Housing Code 9
That is, if permission to enter is not freely granted by the occu-
pant,88 the inspector must apply to a judicial authority for a search
warrant.87
The point of sale ordinances enacted in these cities offer a viable
means to attack deterioration in the housing stock of a city before
blight actually occurs. The constitutionality of this approach will be
explored below.
77. CoDIEDia OwINA cE OF THE CrrY OF SHAKER HEImTS, § 1415.01.
78. Id., §1415.04.
79. Id., § 1415.03.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id., §1415.05.
83. Id., §1415.99.
84. Id.
85. CITY OF SHAKER HEIGHt, HOUSING CODE, §1409.02.
86. Consent must be obtained from the owner or his agent if the property is unoccupied.
87. Crry OF SHAKER HEIGHT, HOUSING CODE, 1409.02.
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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INSPECTIONS AT POINT OF SALE
Constitutional Standards for Administrative Searches
Standards for searches conducted by federal administrative agen-
cies were defined by the Supreme Court in United States v. Morton
Salt Co.85 The Morton Court stated that a search is reasonable "if
the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is
not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably rele-
vant."
9
Since the application of the fourth amendment to the states,"° the
Supreme Court has promulgated standards as to the constitution-
ality of state administrative searches. In Frank v. Maryland,"' the
Court upheld a warrantless inspection conducted by state health
authorities. The state authorities initiated a search of a dwelling in
the belief that the building was infested with rats. 2 The Court con-
cluded that the search was reasonable for two reasons. First, it was
not a search for criminal evidence, and therefore a lesser constitu-
tional standard applied. 3 Secondly, justification for the search
clearly existed: the house was in decayed condition and rodent feces
were found in the backyard of the building. 4
On the privacy issue, the Court relied on the civil nature of the
search,95 and found that administrative inspections, such as these,
were at most of peripheral importance to the privacy concerns pro-
tected by the fourth amendment." The decision in Frank was far
from unanimous. Four justices" vigorously dissented on the ground
that the decision severely diluted the constitutional right to pri-
vacy. 8
In Ohio ex rel Eaton v. Price,9 the Court, in a plurality opinion,
88. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
89. Id. at 652. In the same year the Supreme Court bypassed an opportunity to decide
the constitutionality of warrantless federal health inspections. See District of Columbia v.
Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950). In that case,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals invalidated a warrantless inspection on the grounds
that it was "a fantastic absurdity" to extend fourth amendment protection to a criminal
suspect, but not to a citizen not suspected of any crime. Id. at 17.
90. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
91. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
92. Id. at 361.
93. Id. at 366.
94. Id. at 361, 366.
95. The civil/criminal distinction which the Court relied on in Frank was first promul-
gated in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
96. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 366-67 (1959).
97. The dissenting opinion was written by Justice Douglas and joined by Justices Black
and Brennan and Chief Justice Warren. Id. at 374.
98. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
99. 364 U.S. 263 (1960), aff'd ex necessitate.
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broadened the possible application of Frank. The Court upheld a
warrantless housing inspection, where the warrantless entry was
part of an area inspection program, and where there was no reason
to believe that conditions existed which threatened the health or
safety of the community. 1 Once again, four justices strongly dis-
sented, arguing that Frank was invalid, and that even applying the
rule of Frank, the Eaton search was invalid since it was made with-
out probable cause.101
However, in Camara v. Municipal Court, 102the Court reversed its
earlier trend, overruling Frank v. Maryland, and reversing its origi-
nal rule that administrative inspections were not "searches" within
the meaning of the fourth amenndment.' 3 In a 5-4 decision, the
Court found that the privacy interests of a homeowner confronted
by a local housing inspector at his front door are entitled to constitu-
tional protection. 1'0 In the face of a refusal to admit, the housing
inspector must justify to a judicial officer the need to enter, and
must obtain a warrant to inspect.0 5
In Camara's companion case, See v. City of Seattle, '06 the Court
extended fourth amendment protection to business establishments
undergoing routine inspections. 07 In See, the city was conducting
routine, area-based fire inspections of all commercial businesses.1l 8
The Court held that such inspections could not be made without
either the consent of the owner, or some type of judicial warrant.'"
However, the Court did not give businesses the identical protection
extended to private dwellings in Camara. The Court specifically
stated that businesses, due to their commercial nature, might have
to submit to some warrantless searches, even if made without their
consent." 0
100. Id. at 269.
101. Id. at 269-71. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
103. Id. at 534, overruling Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360(1959).
104. 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
105. Id. at 540.
106. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
107. Id. at 542.
108. Id. at 541.
109. Id. at 545.
110. Id. at 545-46. Thus, even after See, warrantless inspections of private businesses,
conducted as part of a licensing scheme, were upheld in lower federal and state courts. See,
e.g., Harkey v. DeWetters, 443 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971), in
which a local regulation providing a permit system for animal owners was found to be a
justifiable basis upon which to conduct a warrantless inspection of the nonresidential portions
of the animal owner's home. The court distinguished See on the grounds that there, unlike
this case, no licensing program was invoked. Id. at 829; United States v. Sessions, 283 F.Supp.
746 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (holding that a warrantless search of a nightclub conducted by the
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The rules of Camara and See, although promulgated over ten
years ago, remain the controlling standards for administrative
searches.'
Since the plaintiffs in neither Camara nor See consented to the
inspections they challenged, the Court had no opportunity to deal
with the issue concerning valid consent to an administrative inspec-
tion. Thus, to fully understand the constitutional standard applied
to administrative searches, one must look beyond Camara and See
to general principles of consent, as articulated in criminal cases and
in analogous administrative settings. The warrant requirements of
Camara and See must also be examined.
Internal Revenue Service was not unconstitutional); Portnoy v. McNamara, 8 Or. App. 15,
493 P.2d 63 (1972) (upholding a warrantless inspection of the books of a bailbondsman); State
Real Estate Commission v. Roberts, 441 Pa. 159, 271 A.2d 246 (1970), cert. denied 402 U.S.
905 (1971)(holding that a real estate broker waives his right to object to a warrantless search
of his office by the state, upon receiving his license to practice); cf. United States v. Kramer
Grocery Co., 418 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1969)(holding that inspectors from the Food and Drug
Administration must get consent to search a business, but finding that the search had been
conducted pursuant to such consent).
Subsequent to See, the Supreme Court expanded the licensing exception until the rule
which they had promulgated in See, protecting the privacy of business establishments, was
virtually swallowed. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), the
Court condemned a forcible warrantless entry by federal agents into a locked storeroom, but
implied that Congress had power to authorize such actions. Id. at 77. Rozzo, the President of
Colonnade, held both a New York liquor license and a federal retail dealer's occupational
stamp. When Rozzo denied the federal agents permission to enter his locked storage area,
they broke in forcibly. The Court, although holding that the search was unconstitutional,
specifically stated that Congress could, pursuant to the power given to it by the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution, provide for warrantless searches of heavily regulated industries
such as the liquor business. Id. at 76-77.
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), the next case in this area to face the Court
after Colonnade, defined standards for administrative searches exempted from the warrant
requirement under the licensing exception of See. Biswell was a pawnbroker who had a federal
license to sell firearms. Although he claimed not to know that his license would subject his
business to unannounced warrantless inspections, the Court held that his acceptance of the
license constituted implied consent. Id. at 316. The exception to See's warrant requirement
was justified by the following factors: the historical regulation of the firearms industry, like
liquor in Colonnade; the "urgent federal interest" which could be protected only by
"unannounced, even frequent, inspections," id. at 316-317; the existence of a statute which
carefully limited the inspections in "time, place and scope," id. at 315; and the presumptive
knowledge of the licensee.
When, with passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§651
et seq., Congress extended the authority of federal inspectors to conduct warrantless searches
of businesses which were not "heavily regulated," the Supreme Court halted the trend it had
begun in Colonnade and Biswell. In Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., -U.S._, 98 S.Ct. 1816
(1978), the Court invalidated OSHA's provision for warrantless inspections. The vitality of
Camara and See was reaffirmed, and the Colonnade-Biswell line of cases was placed in a
carefully limited category of situations in which there had been a history of pervasive federal
regulation. Id. at 1820.
111. See, e.g., Morris v. United States Dep't of Labor, 439 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D. 111. 1977).
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1. Consent
Consent to a search in effect constitutes a waiver of constitutional
rights and, in criminal cases, will be accepted by the courts only if
voluntarily made."' If a prosecutor relies on consent to sustain the
validity of a search, he bears the burden of proving that the consent
was voluntarily given: "This burden cannot be discharged by show-
ing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority....
Where there is coercion there cannot be consent. 1 3 However, the
standard the Court has set for a valid waiver of fourth amendment
rights is less stringent than that applied to waiver of other constitu-
tional rights. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, "I the Court held that,
unlike a case involving waiver of the fifth amendment protection
against self incrimination," 5 the state need not prove that a person
who acquiesces to a search knew of the right to withhold consent.",
Generally, lower federal courts, in evaluating whether a person
has voluntarily relinquished his fourth amendment rights, have
adopted the concept of "casual" consent."7 For example, in a case
where warehouse owners told Food and Drug Administration inspec-
tors to "go ahead" and inspect, the ensuing warrantless search was
upheld." 8 Although "casual consent" is accepted, it must not result
112. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S.
30, 35 (1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938).
113. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-50 (1968). See also Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
114. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
115. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966); Columbe v. Connecticut, 367
U.S. 568, 604-05 (1961).
116. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). The Court stated:
[Wihen the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify
a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not
the result of duress or coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of
fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the subject's knowledge
of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not
required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a volun-
tary consent.
Id. at 248-49. The dissenters in Schneckloth objected to the double standard of constitutional
rights defined by the majority. Justice Marshall argued that the local police could follow the
FBI practice of advising suspects of their right to refuse a search. The police should not, he
admonished, "capitalize on the ignorance of citizens so as to accomplish by subterfuge what
they could not achieve by relying only on the knowing relinquishment of constitutional
rights." Id. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
117. United States v. Thriftimart, Inc., 429 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
926 (1970), reh. denied, 400 U.S. 1002 (1971).
118. Id. at 1008.
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from intimidation or it will be found to be involuntary and the
ensuing search will be invalidated."'
2. The Warrant Requirement
An administrative search may not be conducted in the absence
of consent unless a warrant, as defined in Camara and See, is ob-
tained. Unlike the criminal search warrant, an administrative war-
rant to inspect a particular dwelling may be based on a variety of
justifications: the existence of a reasonable inspection policy, condi-
tions of housing in an area generally, the age of houses, or the type
of building to be inspected.2 0 Thus, administrative warrants may
issue upon a minimal showing of probable cause, and may be ex-
tremely general in nature.'2 ' Since the state of a particular house
will not be known until the inspection occurs, and in fact (as in the
case of faulty wiring), may not even be known to the householder,
requiring more specificity would defeat the purpose of the pro-
gram.12 Since in most instances involving regulatory inspections no
crime is suspected and no criminal penalties are threatened, the
Camara Court found a reduced standard of probable cause for ad-
ministrative inspections justified.
This diminished standard of probable cause inevitably raises the
question of why there should be any warrant requirement for admin-
istrative searches at all. When there is no reason to believe that a
particular defect exists in a particular house, issuance of such war-
rants may be merely an empty formality.12 However, the Court in
Camara believed that an administrative search warrant was a nec-
essary safeguard. First, it would serve to assure residents that an
independent third party, in the form of a magistrate, would review
the inspection program and determine whether it was reasonable
and supportive of the public interests before allowing inspections to
proceed.' 2' In addition, it assured the individual whose residence
was the subject of a search that his home had not been arbitrarily
119. United States v. Kramer Grocery Co., 418 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1969). See also United
State v. Anile, 352 F.Supp. 14 (N.D. W.Va. 1973). For further discussion, see M. Rothstein
and L. Rothstein, Administrative Searches and Seizures: What Happened to Camara and
See? 50 WASH. L. REv. 341 (1975)(hereinafter referred to as Rothstein and Rothstein). For
critical views of the "casual consent" standard for administrative inspections, see Note, The
Fourth Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YAxL L.J. 521 (1968); Note, Administrative
Inspections and the Fourth Amendment, 12 WAsHBURN L.J. 203, 215-17 (1973).
120. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
121. Id. at 535-36.
122. Id. at 537.
123. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) (Clark, J. dissenting);
Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 119, at 349.
124. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967).
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selected, but chosen pursuant to the guidelines of that particular
inspection program.'5
Although the lower standard of probable cause for administrative
warrants has been sharply criticized,' the Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed the vitality of these regulatory tools in Marshall v. Bar-
low's Inc. "7 In Barlow, the Court held that the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, (OSHA), must, in the absence of con-
sent, obtain a warrant to conduct a safety and health inspection of
a business.In The Court stated that such a warrant was required to
"provide assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is
reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is
pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral cri-
teria."12
The Constitutional Standards Applied
Housing inspection at point of sale differs in significant policy
respects from inspections on grounds of reasonable suspicion of code
violations, as in Camara, and regular area-based fire inspections, as
in See. Yet, the Court's decisions in these two landmark cases sup-
port the constitutionality of the procedures used in a point of sale
inspection policy.
The Camara Court weighed the householder's right to privacy
against the public interest in health and safety. There is little doubt
expressed in the Court's opinion that a public interest in housing
code enforcement exists, not only to abate dangerous conditions,
but also to maintain property values by correcting physical deterio-
ration:
Unlike the search pursuant to a criminal investigation, the inspec-
tion programs at issue here are aimed at securing city-wide compli-
ance with minimum physical standards for private property. The
primary governmental interest at stake is to prevent even the unin-
tentional development of conditions which are hazardous to public
125. Id.
126. Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 119, at 349, 382-84.
127. - U.S. - , 98 S.Ct. 1816 (1978). The Barlow decision was also significant in
that it ended a trend of lower federal and state court decisions, as well as two Supreme Court
decisions, that had broadly interpreted the licensing exception of See, and thus had signifi-
cantly increased the number and type of businesses of which the government could conduct
warrantless searches. See note 110, supra. The Barlow view of the warrant clause is reaffirmed
in Michigan v. Tyler, - U.S. - 98 S.Ct. 1942 (1978), where the court ruled that while
firefighters may remain in a building for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of a blaze
they have extinguished, an administrative warrant is necessary for a later re-entry for further
investigation.
128. Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., - U.S. -, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1826-27 (1978).
129. Id. at 1826.
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health and safety. Because fires and epidemics may ravage large
urban areas, because unsightly conditions adversely affect the eco-
nomic values of neighboring structures, numerous courts have
upheld the police power of municipalities to impose and enforce
such minimum standards even upon existing structures.110
Furthermore, point of sale inspections appear to be a reasonable
exercise of a municipality's police power to achieve these goals.
Although point of sale inspections will not reach all homes in a city
within a limited period of time, they will bring an estimated 5 to 10
per cent of the homes into compliance annually. This increment in
compliance should prevent the decline in physical standards which
often accompanies rapid turnover in home ownership. Point of sale
inspections are unlikely to provide the sole means of code enforce-
ment, but will typically be supplemented by such means as regular
exterior inspections of all properties and inspections upon com-
plaint of adjoining property owners.
Occasionally the same house will be sold twice within a year. In
such instances the point of sale policy could be unduly burdensome.
However, in such a case, the certificate of compliance, which the
city may make valid for a year, covers both transactions, and there-
fore no additional inspections would be required. 3'
The constitutionality of point of sale code enforcement is also
strengthened by the Supreme Court's opinion in See. The See Court
found that business premises could reasonably be inspected "in
many more situations than private homes.' ' 32 Thus, a business
which is already regulated by a licensing process might be subjected
to warrantless inspections. 3 3 The Court explicitly refused to ques-
tion "such accepted regulatory techniques as licensing programs
which require inspections prior to operating a business or marketing
a product.' ' 34 Thus, under See, when a business operator takes out
a license, he or she theoretically agrees to whatever inspections may
be necessary to assure compliance with the conditions of the license.
The sale of a home is not necessarily analogous to marketing a
product, but it is a transaction which occurs in a commercial set-
ting. Inspections at point of sale intrude upon the sanctity of the
home at a time when the owners have already opened up the house
to the public for the purpose of completing a sale. Of course, the
130. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
131. See, e.g., SHAKER HEIGHTS ORDINANCE § 1415.01. However, CINCINNATI ORDINANCE 556-
1973 provides only 180 days.
132. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967).
133. Id. For a discussion of the licensing exception of See, see note 110 supra.
134. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967).
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owners have not, as have licensed businesses, completely opened up
their home by merely putting it into a commercial milieu. However,
under the rationale of See, they have at least significantly dimin-
ished their privacy expectations under the Constitution.
It seems clear, therefore, that an inspection at point of sale policy
is not inherently unconstitutional, though the program still must
conform to the strictures of the fourth amendment. Inspection can-
not be made absent a valid consent, or the issuance of a proper
warrant.
Under the constitutional standards for obtaining valid consent to
a search promulgated by the Supreme Court' 5 and lower federal
courts,'36 it seems reasonable to infer consent to a point of sale
inspection from the seller's request for an appointment for the
inspection. As noted earlier, in Wilson v. Cincinnati,'37 the Ohio
Supreme Court invalidated the criminal penalties in the Cincinnati
point of sale ordinance because, in effect, they coerced consent to
the inspection.' 3 However, the typical enforcement mechanism is
not a criminal penalty, but the existence of an implied warranty to
the buyer if the seller fails to follow code procedures.' 3 Although this
warranty provides grounds for a civil suit, it has not been found
coercive in effect.' 40
Of course, it may not be possible to always obtain the owner's
consent. In that instance, it may be assumed that pursuant to the
standards set for regulatory searches under the Supreme Court's
decisions in Camara and See, administrative warrants may issue.
However, if large numbers of homesellers object and warrants must
be sought, the cost of enforcement would rise, and city authorities
might seek a more generalized warrant. The concept of an area
warrant may not be adaptable to point of sale inspections since
houses are sold simultaneously at scattered locations in a single
municipality. In a sense, the policy particularizes the warrant by
creating a class of houses-those on the market for sale-which the
warrant could cover. The present Supreme Court's attitude toward
such a warrant is speculative, but a majority of the justices now
sitting have indicated their support for area search warrants.
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,"'4 which invalidated a war-
135. See notes 112-116 and accompanying text, supra.
136. See notes 117-119 and accompanying text, supra.
137. 46 Ohio St. 2d 138, 346 N.E.2d 666 (1976).
138. Id. at 145, 346 N.E.2d at 670.
139. See notes 38-86 and accompanying text, supra.
140. See Wilson v. Cincinnati, 46 Ohio St. 2d 138, 346 N.E.2d 666 (1976); Currier v.
Pasadena, 48 Cal. App. 3d 810, 121 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1975).
141. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
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rantless search of an automobile by a roving patrol north of the
Mexican border, Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion suggest-
ing development of an area warrant system for conducting border
searches for illegal aliens.' All four dissenters noted their agree-
ment with Powell on this point,"' and a footnote in the majority
opinion indicated that at least some of the others accepted the area
warrant concept.'" Although Powell conceded that the standards for
probable cause w ould be "relatively unstructured," he argued that
relevant factors could be identified in the factual setting of any
problem area."15 Housing inspection, as in Camara, would provide
an analogue, in that age of housing, reasonable goals of a code
enforcement program, and condition of the entire area were found
to be relevant factors.'4
In Almeida-Sanchez, Powell pointed out that "the judicial func-
tion envisioned in Camara did not extend to reconsideration of 'the
basic agency decision to canvass an area.' ",141 In other words, the
policy decision justified the issuance of the warrant. Here Powell
came close to asserting that the Camara-See administrative warrant
is an area warrant. However, the Camara-See Court clearly envi-
sioned a warrant for a particular entry following refusal at a particu-
lar door, even though probable cause was not required. Since area
search warrants would represent a further dilution of fourth amend-
ment protection of privacy, they do not provide a satisfactory legal
resolution of the issues inherent in administrative inspections.
Assuming that an inspection at point of sale policy is valid under
the federal constitution, such a policy could be blocked under the
provisions of state constitutions. While a state is prohibited from
waiving the warrant requirement provided by the fourth and four-
teenth amendments,"81 it could move in the opposite direction and
provide a stronger shelter for the privacy interests of the home."9
Thus, a state supreme court could construe the search and seizure
142. Id. at 283.
143. Id. at 288.
144. Id. at 270 n.3.
145. Id. at 283-84.
146. Border searches for illegal aliens, like housing inspections, are civil matters, since the
"penalty" is "mere" deportation. There the similarity would seem to end.
147. 413 U.S. 266, 283 (1973).
148. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
149. OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION, BILL OF RIGHTS COMMITTEE, RESEARCH
STUDY No. 44F (Dec. 23, 1974) p. 11. In addition, some state constitutions go beyond the
fourth amendment by specifically protecting "communications", HAWAII CONST. art. J, § 5,
and guaranteeing privacy against "eavesdropping devices", ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6. The Model
State Constitution additionally incorporates the exclusionary rule of Mapp. MODEL STATE
CONST., art. 1.03 (c).
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clause of its state constitution, although identical to the fourth
amendment, to require probable cause and particularity for admin-
istrative warrants.
Such a trend is already visible in criminal cases as some state
supreme courts, reacting negatively to recent Supreme Court deci-
sions, have begun to find new protections for individual rights in
their own constitutions.'50 For example, in State v. Opperman,'5' the
South Dakota Supreme Court upset the conviction of a defendant
on the ground that a warrantless search of his car, impounded by
the police for parking offenses, violated his fourth and fourteenth
amendment rights.'52 The United States Supreme Court reversed,
finding the search reasonable.' 3 On remand, the state supreme
court invited oral arguments on the state constitution's identical
search and seizure clause, and again upset Opperman's conviction.
The South Dakota court stated:
[W]e have the right to construe our state constitutional provision
in accordance with what we conceive to be its plain meaning. We
find that logic and sound regard for the purposes of the protection
afforded by S.D. Const., Art. VI, §11 warrant a higher standard of
protection for the individual in this instance than the United
States Supreme Court found necessary under the Fourth Amend-
ment.'54
At present there is no indication that this trend in state interpreta-
tion of criminal search law will affect judicial perceptions of state
and local authority to conduct administrative inspections. As noted
earlier, the only case law on point of sale inspections, in both instan-
ces from state courts, has found point of sale housing inspection to
be a reasonable policy.'55 Furthermore, the generally rising consen-
sus in favor of rehabilitation and conservation of cities can reasona-
bly be expected to sustain at the state level the concept of point of
sale inspections as currently implemented.
CONCLUSION
The use of inspections at point of sale, as a means of effective
housing code enforcement, can serve as the first step towards at-
150. See State v. Glass, 47 U.S.L.W. 2232 (1978); State v. Brackman, 47 U.S.L.W. 2148
(1978); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d
511 (1975); Toilet v. State, 272 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1973); State ex rel. Arnold v. County Court of
Rock County, 51 Wis. 2d 434, 187 N.W.2d 354 (1971).
151. 228 N.W.2d 152 (S.D. 1975).
152. Id. at 159.
153. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
154. State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 674-75 (S.D. 1976).
155. See notes 38 to 75 and accompanying text, supra.
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tacking housing deterioration, an initial stage of urban decay. The
point of sale inspection enforces the housing code at the time when
money should be available to make corrections, since new home-
owners in the community, protected by their knowledge that spe-
cific code corrections must be made, can negotiate the sale price to
allow for the cost of making necessary repairs. Alternatively, buyers
who receive certificates of compliance know that their residence
meets code standards. The negative aspect of a point of sale pro-
gram, official intrusion into the home, is minimized by the fact that
sellers make an appointment for the inspection during normal work-
ing hours of the city. Thus, inspection occurs at a time chosen,
within limits, by the seller. Anticipatory corrections may be made,
but unlike searches for criminal evidence, action in anticipation of
the "search" furthers the goals of the program. The purpose of the
inspections is not discovery of violations, but maintenance and im-
provement of the quality of the local housing stock.
Although questions have been raised concerning the constitution-
ality of requiring homeowners to submit to governmental searches,
a properly structured point of sale program violates neither an indi-
vidual's fourth and fourteenth amendment rights, nor his constitu-
tional right of privacy. First, as long as the municipality does not
impose criminal penalties for failure to submit to an inspection, an
owner's consent to the inspection serves as a valid waiver of his
rights. Second, administrative warrants, similar to those prescribed
by the Supreme Court in a series of regulatory search cases, may be
issued to authorize inspection in the absence of consent. Finally, in
view of the recent state court decisions in this area, it is doubtful
that this type of inspection program will be found to violate the
provisions of various state constitutions.
As homeowners become aware of the availability of warrant pro-
tection, more may refuse to permit inspection. While this would
increase the cost of the program, it would not defeat the ultimate
goal. In the absence of an escrow agent, the homeowner can sell
without compliance, in which case the traditional rule of caveat
emptor is overcome by a presumptive warranty that the house meets
code requirements. The buyer's remedy is a civil action to recover
the costs of code repairs.
While a municipal point of sale housing inspection program is not
a panacea for an aging community, it may serve as a useful compo-
nent of a total program of code enforcement. The adoption of such
a program works counter to the "throwaway ethic" as applied to
cities, promotes rehabilitation and property maintenance, protects
the buyers of older houses, and supports the human commitment
to urban living patterns.
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